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I Introduction 
 
Globalisation and the availability of information through television and the internet have 
been a boon for the spread of ideas and for freedom of expression. These trends have also 
created challenges for the regulation of expression. Those with hateful views or harmful 
information have just as much access to modern communication tools as the rest of us. 
How policy makers respond to the free flow of information raises a multitude of questions. 
However there is no doubt that the state still holds the upper hand in controlling the freedom 
of movement between borders. Despite the availability of information technology there is 
still a need for interpersonal communication to facilitate the freedom of expression. The 
freedom of movement is therefore important to enabling the freedom of expression, and 
states can restrict the later by restricting the former.   
The aim of this paper is to comprehensively scrutinise the different approaches taken to 
regulating freedom of movement for the purpose of regulating freedom of expression. It 
looks with judicial reviews within common law jurisdictions and how the issue is managed 
within their existing human rights legal frameworks. 
Firstly the paper will lay out a preferred approach to dealing with the regulation of freedom 
of expression in an immigration context, bearing in mind the rights which states have to 
control their borders and the justifications for doing so. The approach places strong 
emphasis on protecting the freedom of expression for all groups without seeking to 
challenge the existence or legitimacy of the ways states choose to regulate expression 
within their borders. It suggests that regulation should be limited to situations where it is 
likely that the visitor would choose to break the laws of the state they seek to visit, or where 
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their visit could spark disruption involving violence which could not reasonably be 
controlled by law enforcement.  
Secondly the paper will examine four cases from two common law jurisdictions in detail. 
There is an emphasis on understanding two themes. The first is explaining the broader 
context of human rights protection within those jurisdictions and how their approach to 
immigration control reflects or contradicts that protection. The second is upon critiquing 
and understanding the administrative law implications of the standards of review applied. 
Reference is made back to the preferred framework to help understand to what extent the 
cases stand for genuine protection of freedom of expression. 
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II Freedom Of Expression And Freedom Of Movement: Preferred 
Framework 
 
 
In this section of the paper I lay out a framework for when I consider it to be justified within 
a free and democratic society to restrict the ability of a foreigner to enter for the purpose 
of restricting their ability to engage in expression. The discussion is broken up into three 
parts. Firstly I will look at the right and ability of states to control their own borders within 
an international law framework, and modern approaches to doing this by liberal 
democracies. Secondly I will look at justifications for the protection of freedom of 
expression and how they apply within the context of freedom of movement. Finally I look 
at when restrictions on freedom of movement on the basis of aiming to restrict freedom of 
expression may be justified within a free society. 
A When Can Government Restrict Freedom Of Movement? 
 
Whether it is a principle of international law that state sovereignty to exclude immigrants 
is absolute is a matter of dispute.1 The role of the state in controlling immigration has 
evolved over time. Provisions concerning the rights of aliens to travel to England for the 
purpose of commerce can be found as far back as the Magna Carta, with clause 41 
guaranteeing the rights of merchants.2 Classical European writers in the field of 
international law like Vitoria, Pufendorf and Vattel appeared not to believe that the right 
to exclude was absolute where aliens came to the state for reasons that were legitimate or 
  
1 R Plender International Migration Law (2nd ed, Martinus Nijworth Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988) at 61. 
2 At 62. 
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necessary. In particular, the right of freedom of movement was used to justify the creation 
of colonies in the Americas.3 
However between the late 18th century and mid-19th century, coinciding with the 
development of the modern nation state, European nations began passing a spate of laws 
controlling and restricting the movement of immigrants.4 In practice very few states argue 
for or act as if a right to international free movement exists. Numerous domestic courts, 
such as the US Supreme Court5 and the Privy Council,6 have held that the right of sovereign 
nations to exclude foreigners is absolute. 
This does not mean that there are no generally accepted obligations for states to consider 
when implementing immigration policy. Firstly, states often enter into bilateral or multi-
lateral treaties to allow free or relatively free immigration between their borders. The 
Schengen Agreement between European states is one example.7 Secondly, states may have 
obligations to particular classes of persons such as refugees although there is no universally 
accepted definition of a refugee and it is unlikely that there is a general obligation to accept 
refugees.8 Thirdly, although states may choose which countries their immigrants come 
from, there is widespread condemnation of policies which systematically discriminate in 
certain ways, for example policies with the overall aim of altering or maintaining the racial 
  
3 At 63. 
4 At 64. 
5 Nishimura Ekiu v U.S. 142 US 651 (1892). 
6 Attorney-General for Canada v Cain, Gilhula [1906] A.C. 542 (PC). 
7 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders 30 ILM 68 
(signed 14 June 1985). 
8 Plender, above at 1, at 394 
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demographics of a country such as those pursued under the so called ‘white Australia 
policy’. 
States expression clear interests through immigration policy. Aside from refugee quotas, 
states often pursue immigration policies with the aim of regulating labour markets, 
ensuring that new immigrants are allowed to meet skill shortages whilst restricting 
immigration flow where an oversupply of labourers may cause unemployment. The 
significance of this is that it reflects the broader state interests in regulating labour markets 
to achieve economic and social policy goals. Family unification is also important in the 
immigration policies of many countries. 
B How Does Restricting Freedom Of Movement Restrict Freedom Of Expression? 
 
There are three major justifications for the protection of freedom of expression within a 
democratic society. I will look at each in turn and how the freedom of movement is related 
to these justifications. 
The first is that freedom of expression is essential to the workings of a democratic process. 
In order for democracy to effectively function it essential that people feel free to express 
their opinions without the overbearing state threatening any kind of persecution. 
Individuals need to feel informed in order to engage in the democratic process. In practise 
this justification for freedom of expression is often the most recognised within the law, 
political expression is regularly afforded protection that other kinds of expression are not. 
It’s clear that the opinions of those outside our borders are relevant to the democratic 
process, and that in some circumstances their ability to voice those opinions is enhanced 
by the freedom of movement. Expanding the number of voices available to the citizenry 
adds to democratic debate, particularly when those voices come from people with a level 
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of expertise or prominence that would not otherwise be available within a countries 
citizenry. 
On 15 September 2014 American journalist Glenn Greenwald made a large impact on the 
New Zealand general election by appearing at an event organised by a political party 
designed to highlight the threat of mass surveillance.9 His visit was a catalyst for the large 
amount of media coverage the issue received over the period he was in the country, during 
which his integrity and evidence for his claims was directly engaged with by the Prime 
Minister and Greenwald gave several interviews to various media outlets. Whilst the fact 
that other foreign activists like Julian Assange and Edward Snowden were able to attend 
the event via video link suggests that with modern technology a physical presence is not 
strictly necessary to engage in democratic discourse, there is no doubt that Greenwald’s 
visit was instrumental to the success of the event.  
One case directly relevant to this issue is the decision by the UK Home Secretary to deny 
Dutch politician Geert Wilders entry to the United Kingdom in 2009.10 Wilders was 
intending to enter the United Kingdom to attend a screening of his controversial anti-Islam 
film Fitna in the Palace of Westminster. The showing was to be hosted by two members 
of the House of Lords. Whilst the film itself was not banned in the United Kingdom, 
prohibiting a figure like Wilders from attend arguably denied the screening prominence as 
well as creating a chilling effect by sending a message that the views expressed in the film 
were illegitimate views to hold in the political arena. 
  
9 David Fisher “Glenn Greenwald: New Zealand has spied on friends for US” (17 September 2014) NZ 
Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
10 Haroon Siddique “Dutch politician attempts to defy UK entry ban to show film critical of Qur'an” (12 
February 2009) The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>. 
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The second justification is that freedom of expression allows the working of a ‘free market 
of ideas’ to most efficiently determine the truth or falsity of ideas. Under this conception 
of expression, ideas are competing narratives whose popularity or ‘market share’ acts as a 
barometer for their value to society. The free operation of this market is more likely to lead 
to the success of better ideas than government intervention. This is firstly because 
government intervention presupposes that governments are able to pick out ‘failed ideas’, 
an assumption that is rejected. Secondly because the market can operate as an effective 
mechanism for killing bad ideas through their debunking and general unpopularity. 
Under this conception, the prohibition of foreigners from engaging in freedom of 
movement on account of their ideas is a form of protectionism, prioritising the ideas of 
domestic producers over foreign competition. Whilst the domestic market may be diverse 
and many ideas disseminated by foreigners may compete on a level playing field through 
mediums which do not require the freedom of movement it still creates a double standard 
between the domestic and the foreign where expression of ideas by aliens is seen as more 
harmful or less legitimate. In some circumstances the domestic market may not specialise 
in producing a particular message meaning foreigners are needed in order to have that 
message properly disseminated. For example a speaker who represented a particular 
religious group which is a minority in one country may have a particular interest in listening 
to a prominent individual from a country whether that religion is a majority. 
It’s clear however that this justification is less respected, in that the governments often 
believe they have a role to play in regulating speech where its harms clearly outweigh its 
benefits. Courts in many countries provide defamation law where damages can be awarded 
against an individual who makes an incorrect and harmful statement. Courts will often 
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issue orders banning the publication of certain material where it breaches a right to privacy 
or is harmful to fairness within the justice system. Many jurisdictions criminalise hate 
speech or expression which aims to incite violence. All of these prohibitions on speech to 
an extent assume a failure in the market for ideas which justifies government intervention. 
The later of these is most relevant to the discussion in that most often the wider harm 
created by hateful speech is community division and an aggressive or even violent backlash 
to such speech. Authorities choose to restrict the movement of certain individuals because 
their physical presence in a country may make them a focal point for these divisions and 
cause reactions. 
The third justification for protecting freedom of expression is to enable self-fulfilment. 
Engaging in expression and debate is said to promote intellectual development and the 
ability to explore competing ideas has inherent benefits to the individual. Being able to 
express ideas freely may be important to you if a certain religious or political philosophy 
is central to your identity and where that idea gives your life purpose and meaning. Being 
able hear the ideas of others can be beneficial in a similar way. 
Often the types of speakers who attract the attention of immigration regulators do so 
precisely because they are the most effective and popular communicators of their message. 
The ability to meet famous speakers may be important because the popularity or 
meaningfulness of an idea can be tied to its most famous communicators.  This is 
particularly true in the case of religious leaders. Direct interpersonal communication can 
also be more enriching than communication through a technological medium. 
C When Is It Legitimate To Restrict Freedom Of Movement In Order To Restrict 
Freedom Of Expression? 
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Although it is established that states have a right to regulate entry through their borders, 
that does not mean they should regulate for any purpose. Immigration policy is not an end 
in itself, it is a means to achieve a diverse range of other ends. It is therefore important not 
to cloud the discussion of immigration policy with the issue of national sovereignty. 
Protectionist rhetoric is too often used as argumentative cover to justify policy made on the 
basis of prejudices rather than clearly defined policy goals matched with appropriate policy 
instruments. 
When the state regulates who may or may not enter the country for the purpose of finding 
work, immigration policy is being used for the purpose of economic policy through control 
of the labour market. It is broadly accepted within liberal democracies that the state has a 
large role in regulation of this sphere of society in order to achieve desired economic and 
social outcomes. By contrast it is largely accepted that the state has a very limited role in 
regulating speech in the public sphere, in particular where this speech is of a political 
nature. Insofar as immigration policy is being used as a tool for regulating speech at the 
whim of decision makers within the executive branch of government where that speech 
would not otherwise be regulated, this should be condemned as illegitimate within a free 
and democratic society. This is especially true since there is no precedent within free and 
democratic societies for regulating the expression of aliens differently from speech by 
citizens. For example the idea of banning books written or published by foreigners or 
regulating web content produced outside of our own borders because we believe that local 
ideas are superior is scarcely imaginable except in authoritarian states. 
That a person is likely to choose to commit crimes if they enter a country is a common 
justification for denying entry to potential immigrants. Almost by definition, the fact that 
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an alien attempting to enter the country would break the law shows that there is a state 
interest in denying them entry. Therefore where there is a particular concern that an alien 
may violate hate speech laws or laws protecting the public order this may legitimately be 
used by the decision maker to justify their exclusion.  
However two considerations need to be kept in mind when using this ground to justify 
exclusion to prohibit the expression of harmful ideas. Firstly the decision maker ought to 
consider not just whether the law is likely to be breached based on their own interpretation 
of the law, but how the courts will interpret the law and how law is enforced in practise. 
Many countries have hate speech laws or laws protecting the public order which could be 
interpreted as being very strict on a wide reading of the legislation but are not enforced in 
that way. Often courts will adopt a narrow reading of these laws in order to protect freedom 
of expression, especially when the meaning of these laws is ambiguous. To pick just one 
example, the New Zealand Supreme Court recently chose to quash a conviction for 
offensive or disorderly behaviour where a protester burned a New Zealand flag near an 
ANZAC Day commemoration service.11 The Court considered s 14 of the Bill of Rights 
Act 199012 and held that it was not sufficient for the offence that others present were 
offended by the behaviour. Police may choose not to enforce these laws except in cases 
where they believe there is a strong public interest in doing so either in order to protect 
freedom of expression, or because they believe it will be too difficult to gain convictions 
under the narrow readings adopted by the courts. 
  
11 Morse v Police [2012] 2 NZLR 1. 
12 Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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To take this point to its logical extremity, if a decision maker could justify refusing to admit 
an alien on the grounds they may break any law, the Minister could consider whether the 
alien is likely to breach totally defunct and unenforced laws. One such example is the 
offence of blasphemous libel under the Crimes Act 1961.13 The enforcement of this law 
could have wide ranging consequences. However while the law has not yet been repealed 
the most recent prosecution for blasphemous libel was in 1922, and the Attorney-General 
would be required to give leave for any prosecutions to occur. The police have chosen to 
not prosecute numerous complaints, including against Canwest Media and Te Papa 
Museum.14 Notwithstanding this, if likelihood of committing a criminal offense of this kind 
were sufficient legal grounds for the Minister to refuse to allow entry, we may end up 
granting this type of discretion to decision makers who could use it to act as censors. 
Secondly the decision maker ought to review the strength of the evidence that the alien is 
likely to break the law when they are in the country. In many cases an individual will have 
previously said things that constitute hate crimes, or even have been charged with hate 
crimes in another country, and this should raise concerns about the likelihood that they will 
commit further crimes whilst in the country. However there should be ways for the alien to 
prove that they have no intention of engaging in this type of speech when in the country. 
The decision maker ought to take into account the specific plans that the alien has for when 
they are in the country. If the plans are not likely to involve any real threat of hate speech 
or violence this should be a strong consideration in favour of allowing entry. They should 
  
13 Crimes Act 1961, s 123. 
14 Rex T Hadar “The Right to Protection of Religious Feelings” (2008) 11(4) Otago LR. 629. 
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take into account the repudiation of views previously expressed insofar as it suggests that 
the speaker has disavowed their hateful opinions. 
That community tension or division may be created by the presence of the individual within 
the country should not be a grounds for denying entry where the likely actions of the alien 
to create this tension would fall short of a criminal offense, except in extreme 
circumstances. Denying entry to a speaker intending to engage in lawful behaviour could 
perhaps be justified where the direct result of entry would be a violent reaction which could 
not be controlled without an extraordinary response, for example wide scale rioting 
responded to by the use of emergency police powers. 
This is firstly because it is too easy to characterise robust and necessary debate within the 
ambit of the amorphous harm of ‘division’ or threats to the harmony of the community. 
Even if the presence of a person in a country can cause harm of this nature, that suggests 
deeper underlying issues that are not being addressed due to lack of discussion so the 
promotion of discussion may be in the public interest in the long run. It is very unlikely for 
example that the brief visit of a prominent Holocaust denier in a non-European country 
with a Jewish community would lead to any major unrest unless there were pre-existing 
issues of anti-Semitism. 
It needs to be remembered that all sorts of groups engage in the types of political protest 
which could be characterised as disruptive or even involves violent. These rarely tear apart 
the fabric of our society, and it would be wrong to shut down discourse in order to avoid 
them. Student led protests against the government of the day15 have a proud tradition of 
  
15 Neil Reid “Protests Blamed on Bill English” (3 June 2012) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
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disruption, as do protests by the anti-globalisation movement16 and the recent Occupy 
movement.17 In these cases the protest was not set off by hate or division, but by reasonable 
disagreements about social and economic policy. If immigration rules could justify banning 
an international anti-globalisation leader, or alternatively a figure passionately resented by 
a movement whose visit would lead to protests they have the potential to chill this kind of 
important discourse. 
Secondly because this effectively creates a ‘hecklers veto’ on debate. Groups can place 
pressure on the government to quash speech they oppose by threatening to engage in the 
very type of action that the government intends to deter. A hecklers veto enshrined in 
immigration law but not in domestic law regulating speech creates a distinction between 
the speech of citizens and aliens which cannot be justified on non-arbitrary grounds. Whilst 
it can be said that the state has no responsibility to protect the free speech rights of an alien, 
it is not done for that purpose. Government ought to protect the rights of its own citizens 
who want to listen to the views of those outside their borders, even if those views are fringe 
or contain elements of what we might consider to be objective harmful speech.  
It is not necessarily only the hateful who wish to listen to controversial speakers. Often 
controversial speakers will be invited to neutral or ideologically opposed forums in order 
to encourage debate. See for example Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 
(notorious for Holocaust denial, anti-Semitic views and homophobic views) invitation to 
  
16 Noah Smith “The Dark Side of Globalization: Why Seattle's 1999 Protesters Were Right” (6 January 2014) 
The Atlantic <www.theatlantic.com>. 
17 “Violent clashes between Occupy Wall Street protesters and police in New York” (17 November 2011) 
The Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
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speak at Columbia University in 2007.18 When David Irving was invited to speak in New 
Zealand it was not by a neo-Nazi or anti-Semitic group, but by the National Press Club.19 
The legitimacy of the grievances held by hecklers may also be questionable. For example 
while we would have considerable sympathy for Holocaust survivors objecting to the visit 
of a prominent Holocaust denier, the same sympathy may not be extended to radical 
elements of religious groups who seek to violently protest provocative criticism of their 
religion, whether that religious group is a majority or a minority.  The decision maker can 
only distinguishing between those types of community division by making judgements 
which go purely to the value of the content of that speech or the legitimacy of anger 
expressed by a certain group. This creates vast discretion for the decision maker to censor 
speech on the basis of their own personal view or to enforce the views of the majority upon 
the minority, when protecting unpopular speech should be the very essence of protecting 
freedom of expression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18 “Ahmadinejad Blasts Israel, Denies Existence of Iranian Gays During Columbia Speech” (24 September 
2007) Fox News <www.foxnews.com>. 
19 “Lawyer bids to get David Irving let in to NZ” (16 September 2004) NZ Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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III Freedom Of Expression And Freedom Of Movement In The United 
Kingdom 
 
A Human Rights And Immigration Framework 
1 Introduction 
 
The ethos of English human rights law stems from the constitutional arrangements of the 
United Kingdom. The lack of a written constitution leaves the process of protecting rights 
primarily to a set of evolving and flexible constitutional conventions and principles which 
are applied by the courts. Although the lack of protections of human rights through the 
existence of ‘supreme law’ may leave human rights constitutionally vulnerable, most often 
the Parliament has been supportive of the human rights project through the passage of 
various statutes.  
The strength of this approach is its malleability, English courts have been able to adopt 
European human rights law and England’s broader international law obligations into the 
English law through the use of statutory interpretation and the standards set in judicial 
review. 
Many explanations of the role human rights play under English law will begin by 
explaining its theoretical underpinnings or historical context by examining historical 
documents like the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1688. Whilst these are significant 
milestones in legal philosophy and history, the simplest explanation for these purposes is 
start from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and go on to examine the 
most directly relevant statute, the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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2 European Convention On Human Rights And European Integration 
 
The modern European project was conceived in the wake of World War II. The devastation 
in Europe created by wars in the preceding 40 years lead to the perception of a greater need 
for a unified Europe, which was seen as a project to be pursued on a legal, social and 
economic level.2021 The ECHR is also part of the broader human rights project that emerged 
after 1945 following the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHR) 
and the Forth Geneva Convention, which came into existence in 1948 and 1949 
respectively.22 
Despite the United Kingdom playing a part in the drafting of the ECHR, its integration into 
the broader English legal framework was gradual. The initial position was that, like other 
treaties, it required the adoption in statute in order to be considered part of the domestic 
law. In 1965 individuals were given the right to petition the European Court of Human 
Rights under the convention.23 Over time common law developed to enable treaties to be 
used as interpretative aids in the process of statutory interpretation. R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department Ex parte Brind [1991] finds that where there are two available 
interpretations of a statutory provision, the interpretation which gives effect to a convention 
right is to be preferred. This is because Parliament is to be presumed to have legislated with 
the intention of complying with treaty rights.  
  
20 H Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, Routledge, Oxon, 2011) at 497. 
21 It’s hard not to be struck by the sentimentality expressed by the drafters of the foundational documents of 
the new international order post World War Two, something rarely seen in more recent treaties. The preamble 
UN Charter, for example, begins with the famous line “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow 
to mankind”. 
22 The preamble to the ECHR refers to the UNDR. 
23 Barnett “Constitutional and Administrative Law”, above n 20, at 497 
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Article 10 covers the Freedom of Expression:24 
 
 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary 
 
3 Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 substantively codifies and gives affect to convention rights 
under English domestic law, making the ECHR the centrepiece of English human rights 
law. Sections one and two lay out which parts of the convention are brought within English 
law and the affect that this has. Section 1(1)-(2) reads:25 
  
24 European Convention on Human Rights ETS 5 (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 
1953), Article 10. 
25 Human Rights Act 1998, s 1 (UK). 
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 1 The Convention Rights. 
(1) In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out 
in—  
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, 
(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and 
(c) Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, 
as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.  
 
(2)Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any designated 
derogation or reservation (as to which see sections 14 and 15). 
 
This incorporates most but not all key rights within the convention. Article 13, which is 
omitted is the right to an effective remedy. The United Kingdom also currently has a 
reservation with respect to Article 2 of the first protocol, accepting the principle of the right 
to an education “only so far as it is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction 
and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure.”26 
Sections 3 and 6(1) set out the primary ways in which the Act enforces the convention 
rights:27 
3 Interpretation of legislation 
(1)So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 
6 Acts of public authorities 
  
26 Schedule 3.  
27 Section 3. 
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(1)It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. 
 
This incorporates the common law position set out above, and is the operative provision 
for the courts to invalidate secondary legislation which is incompatible with convention 
rights. Note that it is also very similar to other statutory provisions such as s 6 the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Sections 4 and 6 deal with cases where the primary legislation is incompatible with a 
convention right. In those circumstances the courts may make a declaration to that effect 
under s 4. However under s 6(2) the courts will neither strike out secondary legislation nor 
overturn the actions of a public authority if it is required to act in a way that is incompatible 
with the convention.28 Section 6(3) goes on to define ‘public authority’. 
4 Immigration Rules 
 
Section 1 of the Immigration Act 197129 empowers the United Kingdom government to 
make regulations to control the entry of persons into the United Kingdom. Within those 
regulations is set out the grounds under which the Home Secretary may refuse leave to 
enter the United Kingdom. Rule 320(6) provides that leave may be refused: 
 
“Where the Secretary of State has personally directed that the exclusion of a person from 
the United Kingdom is conducive to the public good.” 
 
  
28 Section 6 
29 Immigration Act 1971 (UK). 
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While there exists a specialised immigration appeals process for decisions where the Home 
Secretary refuses leave, it specifically exclude decisions where the decisions is based on 
rule 320(6). However these decisions are still reviewable under the normal principles of 
judicial review. 
 
B Farrakhan v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
1 Background 
 
Louis Farrakhan is the head of the Nation of Islam, a predominantly African American 
political/religious movement which has been accused of radicalism and promoting anti-
Semitism.30 Farrakhan has personally been accused of promoting anti-Semitism on several 
occasions.31 Specifically within the United Kingdom, members of the Nation of Islam were 
involved in violent clashes with police outside an inquiry into the police investigation of 
the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence.32 
Mr Farrakhan had been planning to visit the United Kingdom for a number of years and 
had a history of communications with the Home Secretary and officials with regards to his 
eligibility to enter the United Kingdom. On 20 November 2000 the Home Secretary sent 
Mr Farrakhan a letter informing him of his decision to exclude Mr Farrakhan from the 
United Kingdom. Farrakhan applied for judicial review of that decision, and his application 
was successful at the Court of Queen’s Bench, with the decision pronounced on 31 July 
  
30 “What is the Nation of Islam” Anti-Defamation League <www.adl.org>. 
31 R. (on the application of Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 W.L.R. 481 
at [20]. 
32 “Violence disrupts Lawrence Inquiry” (29 June 1998) BBC <www.bbc.co.uk>. 
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2001 and handed down on 1 October 2011.33 The Home Secretary appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. 
2 Decision 
 
It was not at issue that, prima facie, the Home Secretary had the right to exclude Mr 
Farrakhan from the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act 1971. However if the 
decision violates Article 10 of the convention then it can be overturned. It must first be 
established that the convention applies to decisions in an immigration context. 
The Court observes that the issue rarely arises in an immigration context. However in one 
European Court of Human Rights case a German Member of the European Parliament was 
able to successfully challenge a decision to exclude him from New Caledonia, having 
recently visited French Polynesia and campaigned against French nuclear testing and the 
French presence in the Pacific.34  The Court expresses a desire to limit the extensiveness 
of this right in this context. It concludes that Article 10 will apply “where the authorities 
of a State refuse entry or expel an alien from its territory solely for the purpose of 
preventing the alien from exercising a Convention right within the territory, or by way of 
sanction for the exercise of a Convention right.” 
The next issue is the approach that the Court should take to judicial review. The Court 
states that the Wednesbury35 approach is not the correct approach in applying the 
Convention, rather the margin of appreciation approach should be used.36 This generally 
allows for closer review than the Wednesbury test. Article 10.2 makes it clear that the right 
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36 Above at n 31, at [64]. 
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in Article 10.1 are not absolute. In order to decide whether a restriction is justified, the 
Court applies the doctrine of proportionality where it looks at the rights at play and the 
factors in the particular case to decide how wide a margin of appreciation is afforded to the 
decision maker. The wider the margin of appreciation, the less onerous the obligation on 
the decision maker to justify the breach of the right. 
The Court decides that the case is appropriate for a wide margin of appreciation for several 
reasons. Firstly because the immigration context is one where greater autonomy is granted 
to decision makers.37 Secondly because the Home Secretary is a better actor than the Court 
to make decisions. The Secretary is democratically accountable, has more expertise and 
access to more relevant information.38 The decision is also considered a proportionate 
restriction upon Mr Farrakhan’s right to freedom of expression because all he has been 
denied is a particular forum to express his views, he is still free to promote his views in the 
United Kingdom in other ways.39 In coming to this decision the Court of Appeal chides 
Turner J’s approach of requiring the Home Secretary to demonstrate “substantial objective 
justification” for the decision to stand, arguing that this constitutes the judge substituting 
his judgment for that of the decision maker.40 
3 Analysis 
 
 
The Court’s approach to whether Article 10 applies is confusing. Lord Philips firstly claims 
that it is conceded by the Home Secretary in submissions that Article 10 is engaged in this 
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case and that they have “proceeded on the basis of that concession without examining 
whether or not it is correctly made”.41 The Court then embarks on a discussion of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the applicability of the Convention to immigration 
cases. Whilst there are very few cases concerning Article 10 on this point, other 
immigration cases clearly establish that Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family 
life) applies to aliens where Article 8 rights are violated.42 
This still begs the question of which immigration cases engage Article 10. The Court is 
initially quite restrictive on this point, claiming that Article 10 is engaged where authorities 
refuse entry or expel an alien “solely for the purpose of preventing the alien from exercising 
a Convention right within the territory, or by of sanction for the exercise of a Convention 
right”.43 To what extent the Court makes the determination of the basis of the decision is 
left open, however it expresses a willingness to defer to the decision makers stated reasons 
for the decision rather than enunciate the extent to which it can examine those stated 
reasons.44 
Again the Court appears to fudge its answer to the question in this case. It acknowledges 
that preventing Mr Farrakhan from expressing his views was not the “primary object” of 
his exclusion, but that it was merely “one object” of his exclusion.45 However the Court 
then asserts that this is sufficient to bring Article 10 into play. Unless the “purpose” of the 
decision and the “object” of the decision mean two different things, it is difficult to 
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reconcile the Courts statement of the principle of law in paragraph 55 and its application 
of that principle in paragraph 62. 
Aside from the court’s own contradictions, there are two problems with the approach taken. 
Firstly it could present problems for executive accountability. The decision maker could 
frame the grounds of their decision as being outside where the court draws the line of 
application for Article 10 once that line is made clear. Too often, restrictions on speech are 
justified on the basis of protecting national security or other amorphous public interests. If 
the Court agrees to grant a large amount of deference as to whether the right freedom of 
expression is engaged in the first place, it will be abdicating its duty to protect human 
rights. 
Secondly, even if the Court should accept any justification for a decision at face value, the 
justification presented here clearly should not remove freedom of expression as an issue. 
The Court accepts that the basis of the decision was the “risk that his presence in this 
country might provide a catalyst for disorder”, and that this may somehow bring the issue 
outside of the realm of freedom of expression. The type of disorder envisioned is based 
upon a single incident where three protestors from the Nation of Islam was arrested while 
protesting outside an inquest into the death of teenager Stephen Lawrence. They were 
charged with minor offenses. While this was no doubt disorderly it also occurred in the 
context of a protest about a legitimate issue for a disenfranchised minority. Even if an 
isolated incident is sufficient evidence that Mr Farrakhan’s visit will provoke disorder, the 
basic question that is never asked was: Is the Secretary entitled to conclude, as a matter of 
law, that excluding Mr Farrakhan to prevent a repeat of this type of act is in the public 
good? An assessment based upon an understanding of the importance of freedom of 
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expression and the constitutional protections of freedom of expression may well have 
concluded that he was not. 
There are reasons to believe that Mr Farrakhan’s speech deserves particular protection. The 
Court of Appeal saw Mr Farrakhan as a harmful voice in social discourse, it seemed 
incapable of looking past Mr Farrakhan’s anti-Semitic comments to the wider social 
context of his visit. Black communities in the United Kingdom are a disenfranchised 
minority. They are poorer46, more unemployed,47 less likely to vote,48 underrepresented in 
Parliament49 and more likely to be discriminated against in the criminal justice system.50   
Why might protests outside the Stephen Lawrence inquest have turned violent? In 1993 
Lawrence died of stab wounds in a racially motivated murder while waiting at a bus stop. 
Five suspects were tried and acquitted. The inquest into the murder found that officers 
investigating the murder had been “incompetent” and that the Metropolitan Police were 
“institutionally racist”.51 It should be no surprise that these issues create profound 
institutional distrust between the government and minority groups, and that this sense of 
hopelessness may lead to violent protest. 
That these groups feel they cannot resolve these issues through democratic processes 
should reflect poorly on those democratic processes as much as it does on those who 
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commit disorderly acts at protests. In order to defend the rights of these minorities, the 
Court needs to be even more strenuous about protecting their expression, especially since 
officials accountable through the traditional democratic channels that fail minorities are 
less likely to take their interests into account. To take the symbolic act of denouncing 
Farrakhan by excluding him from the country risks being seen as a further form of 
oppression, which may be more likely to lead to disorder than his visit. It risks binge seen 
as the very silencing of minorities that hate speech laws are intended to prevent. Turner J 
to his credit does consider the disadvantage as a factor in his decision.52 
The other possible kind of disorder possibility considered by the Secretary is that public 
meetings hosted by Mr Farrakhan will lead to disorderly responses by those who disagree 
with him. If this is the case, then the hecklers veto is being invoked to deny Mr Farrakhan 
entry. It is disappointing that the freedom of expression implications of issue are not raised 
by the Court of Appeal. 
The grounds given to justify a wider margin of appreciation merit a further look. It 
shouldn’t be ignored that the Court is not the decision maker, its role is to review the 
decision rather than remake it based on the merits of the decision. There is a philosophical 
battle between the concepts of deference and the ‘hard look’ approach, and which approach 
to take requires a subjective assessment based on the circumstances.53 However in my 
assessment the Court is too deferential to the decision maker in this case. The Court 
suggests that because the decision maker is democratically accountable their decisions 
warrant less scrutiny. But this ignores the difference between democracy and human rights. 
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Democracy is not necessarily capable of protecting rights when the rights concerned are 
those of a minority. The judiciary ought to regard itself as the guardian of rights in a 
democratic society, it is the only institution capable of doing so in cases of this nature. 
Judicial power is not necessarily a usurping of executive authority when that power has 
been given to it by Parliament through legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998.  
C Naik v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
1 Background 
 
Dr Naik is an Indian Muslim personality of considerable influence due to his work as a 
public speaker, ‘spiritual guru’, community leader and author. He was ranked as one of the 
top ten spiritual gurus in India in 2010 and top 100 most influential people in India.54 He 
had been a regular visitor to the United Kingdom since 1990, making several public 
speeches at Islamic events.55  
Naik has been accused of sympathizing with and promoting terrorism. Among his 
controversial statements he has made comments in public forums sympathetic to the cause 
of Osama Bin Laden saying that he is “fighting the enemies of Islam” while also saying 
that he does not condone violence against innocent people. He has promoted September 11 
conspiracy theories and the belief that “America is controlled by the Jews.”56 
In mid June 2010 he planned to speak at a major event at Wembley Stadium expected to 
attract as many as 45,000 people. The planned visit received attention from tabloid 
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newspapers on 30 May 2010 where a story ran under the headline “Muslim preacher of 
hate is let into Britain”.57 
In response Dr Naik’s representatives met with officials from the Home Office asserting 
that Dr Naik intended to promote a message of peace based on Islamic values on his 
speaking tour and that he had spoken out against terrorist attacks such as 9/11. However 
on 16th June, two days before his scheduled arrival, the Home Secretary made the decision 
to exclude him. A letter sent on 17th June informed Naik that he was to be excluded “for 
engaging in unacceptable behaviour by making statements that attempt to justify terrorist 
activity and fostering hatred”58 and that his visa was being revoked on grounds that it was 
“conducive to the public good”. Several days later Dr Naik took judicial review 
proceedings. He was unsuccessful at the Court of Queen’s Bench, however the Court of 
Appeal agreed to hear the case.  
2 Decision 
 
In considering the applicability of Article 10 to aliens, the original Court held that the 
decision in Farrakhan was not binding and relied on other Strasbourg authority to suggest 
that Article 10 was territorially limited.59 The judge however concluded that Dr Naik’s 
supporters who wished to see him in the United Kingdom could rely on Article 10 as their 
freedom of expression was curtailed by being denied the ability to see Dr Naik, while not 
ruling on the question of whether Naik could rely on Article 10.60 
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The Court of Appeal struggled on this point because the authorities which examined the 
limits of Article 10 were not always consistent. Counsel for the Home Secretary attempted 
to distinguish one case on the grounds that the applicant was physically present in the 
country when the judicial review application was made.61 However the Court concluded 
this approach would be unfair since it would disadvantage visitors who took the reasonable 
step to apply for a visa before arriving in the country.62 
The approach in Naik differs from Farrakhan in that it ignores whether the decision maker’s 
stated reasons for exclusion directly relate to freedom of expression. Once the applicability 
of Article 10 is established and the Court accepts that freedom of expression is curtailed, it 
is assumed that the decision is reviewable under Article 10.63  
The judge takes a different approach to Farrakhan in applying the proportionality test, 
viewing Farrakhan as outdated.64 Instead of looking at various factors which could limit or 
widen the margin of appreciation the Court compares the extent to which it could differ to 
the decision maker on the content of the issue concerned to the importance of the Court’s 
role in acting as a ‘guardian of human rights’.65 In weighing these up it concludes that the 
Court is required to satisfy itself that rights intrusion is proportionate to the legitimate 
purpose, and that the reasons given for the exclusion were relevant and sufficient.66  
On the issue of proportionality, the Court rejects the logic in Farrakhan that the intrusion 
into human rights in an immigration context is lessened because the applicant is only being 
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denied a forum rather than the opportunity to express their views at all. This is irrelevant 
to the proportionality question, since by its own logic the benefit of promoting the public 
good is also reduced if the applicant can speak in other ways.67 It also ignores the symbolic 
relevance of the decision itself as a public act of condemning a particular form of speech.68   
In the end, the issue which the judges seems to find most decisive is one not raised in 
Farrakhan. Following the London bombings of July 7th 2005 the Home Secretary adopted 
a new policy of exclusion based on a list of unacceptable behaviours including expressing 
views which “foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular 
beliefs” or “foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK”, and 
the decision is founded on this policy.69 Carnwath LJ devises a three part test for deciding 
whether a decision made according to the policy is reviewable:70 
 
“(1) had Dr Naik engaged in the types of behaviour listed in the August 2005 statement? 
(2) if so, had he not only repudiated such views, but demonstrated publicly that he had done 
so? (3) would his exclusion under the policy be proportionate in relation to its legitimate 
aims?” 
 
The judges are persuaded that the reduced discretion inherent in applying this policy, 
combined with the fact that the legitimacy of the policy is not itself challenged makes the 
decision more legitimate. On the first question it is found that the behaviour clearly violates 
the policy, the qualifiers on his statements endorsing terrorism were not sufficient. On the 
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second Carnwath LJ acknowledges that while Naik has provided strong evidence including 
witness statements that his general message is a peaceful one, he has not fulfilled the terms 
of the policy to specifically repudiate statements where he appears to support terrorism. On 
the question of proportionality it is agreed that the goal of protecting national security is 
sufficiently important to justify the limitation on expression.71 
3 Analysis 
 
The issue raised in this case which distinguishes it from other similar cases concerning 
freedom of movement and expression in that it more clearly falls within a national security 
context because the controversial statements involved concern the promotion of terrorism. 
National security considerations seem very different to considerations related to 
‘community disharmony’ or ‘division’. Where the perceived harms from those issues 
derives from expression occurring within the realm of democratic debate or a market of 
ideas, the harm from the promotion of terrorism is far more tangible and substantial.  
After the events of September 11 2001, balancing the needs of national security with human 
rights has become a heightened theme in public debate. The most significant post 9/11 case 
in the United Kingdom balancing these rights and concerns is A and others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.72 The case concerned the detention without trial of foreign 
terrorist suspects under the now repealed Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.73 
The government acknowledged that the policy violated human rights and sought a 
derogation under s 1(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998. According to the majority the 
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policy failed the proportionality test. Because the policy discriminated between foreign 
nationals and citizens it could not be shown to be necessary for national security.74 
The approach advocated in A is for the role of the court as a protector of human rights and 
against the philosophy of judicial deference on questions of human rights, even though 
substantial weight is given to the executive’s judgment on what measures are needed to 
protect national security. Although in Naik the judges are at pains to point out that they are 
not substituting the decision of the Home Secretary for their own,75 it is clear that they do 
not adopt a policy of judicial deference. Ensuring that the standard of review is that 
evidence considered by the decision maker is “relevant and sufficient” is a significant 
departure from Farrakhan, where no real attempt is made to review the strength of the 
evidence presented by the Home Secretary. 
A further blow to the Farrakhan decision is the judgment rejecting the argument that the 
rights abrogation is not significant because restricting movement only denies the speaker a 
forum. According to Carnwath LJ this holds little weight in a proportionality analysis, 
firstly because it also shows that there are limited benefits to excluding the applicant, and 
because the decision to exclude also carries symbolic value.76 Recall that this was a 
significant part of the proportionality analysis in Farrakhan. 
The way the case is decided by Carnwath LJ still raises questions. Firstly, he appears to 
place great weight on the fact that the unacceptable behaviours policy itself is not being 
challenged as violating convention rights, only the application of it.77 It would have been 
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interesting to discuss to what extent the policy violates Article 10 nonetheless. The relevant 
section of the policy provides:78 
 
3. The list of unacceptable behaviours is indicative rather than exhaustive. It covers any 
non-UK national whether in the UK or abroad who uses any means or medium including:  
• Writing, producing or distributing material; 
• Public speaking including preaching 
• Running a website; or 
• Using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth leader 
To express views which:  
• Foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs; 
• Seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; 
• Foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts 
or; 
• Foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.” 
 
On its face the policy does restrict freedom of expression. Furthermore it could fail the 
proportionality test for the same reason the policy in A failed: it discriminates between 
foreign nationals and citizens. However as suggested by Cranston J in the decision on 
appeal the rights limitation may be justified under article 10(2).79 The policy struck down 
in A was a vastly more abhorrent abrogation of rights. 
The logic used by Carnwath LJ to judge the application of the policy may be questionable. 
At various points the judge lauds the flexibility of the policy which provides “an indicative 
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rather than exhaustive list” of excludable behaviours and acknowledges that the stated 
reasons for exclusion are “a legitimate extension of the spirit of the policy”.80 If this is the 
case then it is questionable whether the policy is limiting the “undefined, general 
discretion” of the Home Secretary that the Court opposes in a way that makes their decision 
more legitimate.81 
 
D Geert Wilders Case 
1 Background 
 
Geert Wilders is a Dutch Member of Parliament, and the leader of the Partij voor de 
Vrijheid or Party for Freedom (PVV). The PVV is generally characterised as a right wing 
or far right wing populist party. It opposes immigration and is anti-Islamic. In 2009 the 
PVV was the 5th largest party in terms of seats in the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 
(lower house). At the subsequent elections in 2010 it became the 3rd largest party, 
demonstrating a rich vein of support for its leader and ideology in the Netherlands. 
Wilders is most controversial for his statements about Islam, saying that “Islam not as a 
religion, but a dangerous, totalitarian ideology, equal to communism and fascism.”82 He 
has argued that there is “no such thing as moderate Islam”, that the Koran is “a book of 
war” stated that “Islam is a threat to Western civilisation and Dutch culture.”83 In 2008 
Wilders produced a short film, Fitna, about the Koran, terrorism, and Islam in the 
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Netherlands.84 Wilders then conducted the “Facing Jihad World Tour” showing the film in 
various countries such as the United States.  
Wilders was invited to show the film in the House of Lords by Baroness Cox and Lord 
Pearson on 12 February 2009. On 10 February he received a letter from the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department informing him that he would not be allowed entry to the 
United Kingdom. He chose to travel to London Heathrow Airport anyway, where he was 
met by an immigration official and refused entry under regulation 21 of the Immigration 
(European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Wilders appealed to the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal. 
2 Tribunal Decision 
 
The European Economic Area provides for a greater freedom of movement between 
countries than would normally exist under the Immigration Act 1971. Below is a brief 
guide through the relevant regulations which permit entry to European citizens and allow 
exclusion in limited circumstances:858687 
 
Regulation 11(1) 
“An EEA National must be admitted to the UK if he produces on arrival a valid national 
identity card or passport issued by an EEA state.” 
Regulation 19 
  
84 “Dutch anti-Muslim politician Geert Wilders to screen Fitna film in Washington” (24 February 2009) The 
Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
85 GW (EEA reg: 21: ‘fundamental interests’) Netherlands [2009] UKAIT 00050, at [8]. 
86 At [9] 
87 At [11] 
38  
 
“A person is not entitled to be admitted to the UK by virtue of Regulation 11 if his exclusion 
is justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health in accordance with 
Regulation 21.” 
 Regulation 21 
(1) In this regulation a ‘relevant decision’ means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. 
(2) A relevant decision may not be taken to serve economic ends. 
(5) Where a relevant decision is taken on the grounds of public policy or public security it 
shall, in addition to complying with the preceding paragraphs of this regulation, be taken 
in accordance with the following principles: 
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality. 
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned. 
(c) the personal conduct of the person concerned must represent a genuine, present, and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. 
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of 
general prevention do not justify the decision. 
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision”. 
 
Recall Article 10 of the ECHR, which is also relevant to the decision. 
The Tribunal had to consider what would constitute a “threat affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society”.  It concluded that any likely actions taken by Mr Wilders 
that would be neither unlawful nor prohibited (a breach of the peace being prohibited but 
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not unlawful) could not constitute such a threat, as the function of the law was to protect 
the fundamental interests of society.88 
The Tribunal then turned to the potential offences which Mr Wilders may commit while in 
the United Kingdom. The only one considered relevant was s 5 of the Public Order Act 
1986 which reads:89 
 
Section 5 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he: 
(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or 
(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive 
or insulting, 
within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress 
thereby. 
 
The Tribunal considered the Secretaries judgment that denial of access was justified under 
regulation 21(5)(c) to be deeply flawed. In the first place it appeared to be based on the 
understanding that a threat to “community harmony” constituted a threat to public security 
and would therefore justify exclusion.90 It found that the Secretary had presented no 
evidence of the type of threat Mr Wilders presented, and that no such evidence existed. 
That Mr Wilders had visited the United Kingdom and other European countries previously 
and that his film was widely available in the United Kingdom without causing and public 
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order difficulty were taken into account by the Tribunal.91 The Tribunal also dismissed the 
fact that Mr Wilders was being prosecuted in the Netherlands for charges relating to public 
order as irrelevant because those charges had not been proven. 
The Tribunal made two distinctions between this case and Farrakhan. Firstly that as a 
Dutch citizen Mr Wilders was entitled to an underlying right to entry into the United 
Kingdom where Mr Farrakhan as a United States citizen was not.92 Secondly that Mr 
Wilders intended to speak to parliamentarians and hold an open question and answer 
session, where as Mr Farrakhan mainly intended to hold private meetings with his 
followers.93 
3 Analysis 
 
It is worth exploring the justification for distinguishing between Farrakhan and this case. 
As stated above the Tribunal gives two reasons. The first is that Farrakhan is a United 
States citizen and thus does not have the same ‘underlying right’ to enter the United 
Kingdom that a Dutch citizen does. The judgement places great emphasis on European 
citizenship being a crucial protection for Wilders freedom of expression. It is said that this 
underlying right increases the standard of review, so that a smaller abrogation of free 
expression is required to rule in Wilders favour.  To some extent this reflects the philosophy 
behind immigration law: aliens are not citizens and their rights are subject to the whim of 
the state. But different classes of people who are not citizens are commonly given rights 
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short of citizenship. The European Economic Area provides European citizens with quasi-
citizenship rights in respect of immigration. 
Regulation 11(1) appears to be the basis for this underlying right. However regulation 11(1) 
is ultimately subject to regulations 19 and 21 so needs to read in this light. Rule 21 appears 
to be designed with similar language to rule 320(6). One grants the right to exclude on the 
basis of the ‘public good’, the other on the basis of ‘public policy, public security or public 
health.’ Rule 21 in the European regulations is qualified in two main respects: Firstly the 
decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual. Secondly this 
must violate a ‘fundamental interest’ in society. Beyond applying these rules as they were 
intended there seems little reason to suppose that the ‘underlying right’ entitles Wilders to 
a more thorough review than anyone else. It was established in Farrakhan that the right to 
freedom of expression exists primarily to benefit the followers of Mr Farrakhan who are 
British citizens. They should not have lesser rights under the ECHR because the person 
they wish to listen to is not European.  
The second reason given to distinguish between the cases is that Wilders intended 
expression might “inform the votes of voters as well as the laws of lawmakers and the 
policy of policy makers” and that this was significant because “freedom of speech in a 
democratic society is one of the ways that democracy works”. This is a clear appeal to the 
democratic justification for protecting speech, elevating it above other justifications. While 
facilitating democracy is without doubt a noble reason for protecting freedom of 
expression, to prioritise it over other reasons for expression is state centric and ignores the 
importance of social issues that aren’t directly played out in the ballot box. Mr Farrakhan 
had valid reasons for meeting his supporters in private, and engaging with the international 
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head of the movement would be extremely important to them as a disenfranchised minority. 
The role that expression plays in helping disenfranchised groups understand their place in 
society is arguably more important than the discussion between those who feel empowered 
enough to engage with democracy. 
Let us turn to the justification used by the Home Secretary. There were many problems 
with the Secretary’s attempt to equate ‘community harmony’ with a threat to public 
security. Firstly it did not attempt to address the question of what constitutes a ‘fundamental 
interest’, which the Tribunal took a very different view of. The definition given to a threat 
fundamental interests by the Tribunal, that it must involve a prohibited act’ is an aggressive 
attempt by the Tribunal to protect the freedom of expression of European citizens. Such a 
definition was available and may have therefore been required by s 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.  
One could go further than the Tribunal and suggest that s 21(5) prevents non-criminal 
prohibited acts, such as breach of the peace, from being considered. The Tribunal cites R 
(Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire94 as authority for the proposition that a 
breach of the peace is a prohibited act. The case concerned anti-war protesters on their way 
to a protest in a bus who were stopped and turned around (but not arrested) by police. The 
House of Lords found that police had a reasonable belief that the protesters may have been 
intending to commit a breach of the peace when they arrived at the protest. That action 
taken by the police was nonetheless found to be illegitimate because a breach of the peace 
must be imminent before it can be acted against in this fashion. It is likely the House of 
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Lords was influenced by Article 10 of the ECHR.95 If this same right were to be upheld in 
an immigration context it would suggest that, since a breach of the peace was in no way 
imminent upon Wilders arrival at London Heathrow Airport, a belief backed by evidence 
that Wilders entry to the United Kingdom would lead to a breach of the peace does not 
justify his exclusion.  
Section 21(5)(c) is of particular interest because it appears specifically designed to 
eliminate the hecklers veto as a justification for exclusion. On the one hand, its presence 
does suggest that the Tribunal’s interpretation of ‘fundamental interest’ is incorrect. If only 
the commission of a crime or breach of the peace is sufficient to affect a fundamental 
interest, then s 21(5)(c) is redundant, since by definition all crimes are based on an 
individual’s conduct (the term being sufficient to cover both an act and omission).96 On the 
other it seems fatal to the link made by the Secretary between the threat Wilders posted to 
‘community harmony’ and public security. Although the Secretary’s approach is simply to 
ask the Tribunal to show deference rather than give specifics about how Wilders visit 
threatened community harmony, it seems likely the Secretary envisioned a reaction by 
sections of the Muslim community similar to the 2006 Islamist demonstration outside the 
Embassy of Denmark in London (where some protesters carried signs reading “Massacre 
those who insult Islam” and wore mock suicide vests) in response to the Danish 
Muhammad cartoons.97 Any consideration that these types of actions would lead to harm 
would be a prohibited consideration under s 21(5)(c). 
  
95 At [34]. 
96 DJ Baker, G Williams Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2012) 
97 Owen Bowcott “Arrest extremist marchers, police told” (6 February 2006) The Guardian 
<www.guardian.co.uk>. 
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Another argument used by the Secretary is that any decision by the government to allow 
Wilders to enter the United Kingdom would be seen as ‘welcoming’ him, and thereby 
implicitly endorsing his views which may promote further community resentment.98 The 
argument is quite rightly dismissed by the Tribunal as troubling.99 The fact that this 
argument was even made seems indicative of the thought process of politically accountable 
decision makers, who may face a majoritarian backlash simply from the refusal to exercise 
their powers against people with unpopular views however capricious that exercise of 
power may be. It shows the need for a hard look approach to review when protecting speech 
where the power to restrain is so broad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
98 At [32]. 
99 At [33] 
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IV Freedom Of Expression And Freedom Of Movement In Australia: David 
Irving’s Struggle  
 
A Human Rights Framework In Australia 
 
Australia essentially has no protection for freedom of expression that is comparable to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 or the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 
that exists on a Federal level. Any state level protections would be irrelevant to immigration 
decisions. When the Australian Constitution was initially debated in the 1890’s a proposal 
to include a Bill of Rights was considered and rejected.100 
Australia inherited English common law and so many of the equivalent common law 
protections of human rights nonetheless exists. Furthermore a right to political expression 
has been read into the Australian Constitution in some High Court cases.101 
B Background 
 
David Irving is a British historian who is most prominent for his status as a Holocaust 
denier. He has written several well publicised books about Nazi Germany and World War 
Two. 
Much of Irving’s work is widely discredited. Although Irving has claimed that he is not 
anti-Semitic and has branded himself as a ‘Holocaust revisionist’ he has on numerous 
occasions associated with neo-Nazi groups, expressed anti-Semitic sentiments and denied 
the existence of any gas chambers at Auschwitz altogether. He has also knowingly used 
  
100 “How are Human Rights Protected in Law?” (2006) Australian Human Rights Commission 
<www.humanrights.gov.au>. 
101 See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
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fabricated source material to back up his claims. In 1996 Irving sued American author 
Deborah Lipstadt and her publisher for comments made about him in her book Denying 
the Holocaust. In a 333 page judgement it was found that all allegations against Irving were 
substantially true.102 
Irving has also had multiple serious legal problems associated with his overseas travel and 
the views he has expressed on the Holocaust. In 1992 Irving was deported from Canada 
and he has been denied entry to countries including Italy, New Zealand103 and Australia. 
Irving has faced multiple prosecutions for Holocaust denial including facing a 10,000 
Deutschmark fine in Germany in 1992. In February 2006 Irving was sentenced to three 
years in prison in Austria.104  
In December 1992 Irving lodged an application for a business visitor (short stay) visa to 
promote sales of his books by way of speaking engagements and media interviews. In 
February 1993 the Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs rejected 
Mr Irving’s application after the Jewish community indicated strong opposition to his visit. 
He filed for judicial review of that decision. Irving had previously visited Australia in 1986 
and 1987 for similar tours without incident. 
C Decision and Judicial Review 
 
An applicant is required to meet a number of public interest criteria, defined in regulation 
2 in order to receive a business visitor (short stay) visa under the Migration Regulations. 
  
102 Irving v Penguin Books Ltd [2000] EWHC QB 115 (UK). 
103 “Lawyer bids to get David Irving let in to NZ” (16 September 2004) NZ Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
104 “Holocaust denier Irving is jailed” (20 February 2006) BBC <www.bbc.co.uk>. 
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After receiving advice, the Minister chose to decline the application because Irving did not 
meet ground (c) of the public interest criteria. Ground (c) requires that the applicant:105 
 
“is not determined by the Minister acting personally to be likely to become involved in 
activities disruptive to, or violence threatening harm to, the Australian community or a 
group within the Australian community.” 
 
The main guidance on how to interpret this ground comes from the Controversial Visitors 
Policy drafted by the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs. 
Sections 9.1.1 to 9.1.2 read as follows:106 
 
9.1.1 
“Visitor policy seeks to exclude from Australia person who have planned or participated 
in, or been active in promoting political motivated violence or criminal violence including 
particularly acts of terrorism; and/or are likely to propagate or encourage such actions 
during a visit to Australia. It also seeks to exclude person who may pose some threat or 
harm to the Australian community.” 
9.1.2 
“A proposed visit by a person, the presence of whom in Australia may precipitate the sort 
of vigorous or controversial debate which may take place in a democratic society, is not 
sufficient reason to refuse that person a visa” 
 
  
105 Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 44 FCR 540 (WADC), at 
546. 
106 Laurence W Maher “Migration Act Visitor Entry Controls and Free Speech: The Case of David Irving” 
(1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 358 at 367 
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In a letter to Irving dated March 8th 1993 the Minister confirmed the reasons for his 
decision. The letter states that “the fact that persons may be affronted by your opinions is 
not relevant. What is of concern is the effect that your presence in Australia will have 
within the community.” The letter went on to specify that “I am satisfied that if I had 
approved your proposed visit your activities in relation to the promotion of your books 
would have been disruptive to the Australian community or a group within the Australian 
community.”107 The initial judicial review, heard by French J in the Western Australia 
District Court, was unsuccessful.108 The appeal was heard by the Full Court. 
The Court was in agreement in quashing the appeal. It found that in order for the Minister 
to decline the application under (c) he had to be satisfied of two things. Firstly that activities 
would occur which would be disruptive to the Australian community, and secondly that 
Irving would be involved in those activities.109 
Under the first requirement, it was found that vigorous expressions of support for or 
opposition to the opinions of the authors and minor breaches of the peace would not be 
sufficient to constitute the type of disruption created by the section. The conduct would 
have to entail “divisive acts the community would not be expected to tolerate”110 or 
“threaten the normal cohesiveness of the community” in a harmful way.111 It was not 
required that the division lead to physical violence. The extent to which these events would 
be expected to be controlled by law enforcement would be an appropriate consideration.112 
  
107 At 549. 
108 Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 115 ALR 125 (WADC). 
109 Above at 105, at 551. 
110 At 551. 
111 At 544. 
112 At 551. 
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Under the second requirement, it was necessary that the visitor would be connected with 
the occurrence of disruptive events. The connection be more than the mere presence of the 
visitor in Australia at the time that the activities occurred.113 However the applicant need 
not engage in the activities, it would be sufficient that their presence acted as a focal point 
for division.114 
The Court found that the word ‘likely’ in the section meant that the Minister was required 
to assess the probability of certain events occurring, and had to show that there was 
“credible material supporting a conclusion that there was a likelihood”. There were two 
potential divisions that were possible: The first was a potential division between the 
proponents of free speech and the Jewish community. The second was that the activities 
engaged in by Irving would disrupt the Jewish community.115 
The key finding of the Court was that there was not sufficient evidence supporting the 
conclusion that activities of the type contemplated (book promotion events) would be likely 
to cause division. There is a statutory grounds for review under the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977116 where a decision can be reviewed if “that there 
was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision”. The Minister 
mainly relied upon a somewhat provocative letter sent by the Irving to the editor of the 
Australian Jewish News concerning his upcoming visit in which he accused the “organised 
Jewish community” of suppressing public debate through violence, property damage or 
blackmail in other parts of the world, stating that such tactics “only increase anti-Semitism, 
  
113 At 551. 
114 At 544. 
115 At 544 
116 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, s 5(1)(h) (Cth) 
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which I deplore”. The Court did not regard this letter as a reasonable basis to conclude that 
Mr Irving’s visit would cause the type of division required by ground (c). The appeal was 
allowed and the matter was remitted to the Minister for reconsideration. 
D Analysis 
1 Level Of ‘Involvement’ 
 
The interpretation of the term ‘involved’ raises a number of significant issues concerning 
the freedom of expression. While the issue was not decisive, the Court adopted a wide 
meaning of the term which can be characterised as only slightly more than a ‘but for’ test 
for involvement: there must simply be a causal connection between the visit and the 
disruption. The visitor need not participate in disruption or violence or encourage 
disruption or violence by their supporters.117 The reaction need not be a proportionate, 
reasonable, justifiable or even logical response to any views expressed by the visitor. This 
is effectively the enshrinement of the hecklers veto. 
The public view of the visitor may not even need to be accurate to create the type of 
community division that would justify exclusion. Drummond J suggests that inaccurate 
media narratives may indicate the type of community division that would justify 
exclusion:118 
 
“There may be circumstances in which media comment might be sufficient to justify the 
Minister in refusing a person entry to Australia... 
  
117 At 551 
118 At 567 
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The way the media depicts such a person may be a guide, unfair though it will be, if 
inaccurate, to the reaction by people here to his presence” 
 
The possibility of media driven fear being a direct mechanism to curtail freedom of 
expression is frightening to those who value human rights. This fear, potentially whipped 
up by tabloid media and populist fervour is exactly the sort of reaction that should never 
justify the limitation of freedom of expression. If anything it should justify a right to correct 
the record and a need for government to encourage participation in the marketplace of 
ideas. 
Drummond J was also the only judge to explicitly recognise this tension. In his judgement 
he admits:119  
 
“So construing the Regulations and, in particular, criterion (c), has the result that a person 
can be lawfully excluded from entry to Australia where he has only limited opposition 
within the Australian community but that opposition is prepared to threaten violence in 
demonstrating their opposition to him, if he is allowed into the country. This can make 
freedom of speech a hostage to the willingness of a few already living in Australia to break 
the law. But I think the Regulations bring the balance down between freedom of speech 
and the preservation of order and calm within the Australian community in that way” 
 
Although it is argued that the regulations strike a balance, the wide interpretation of 
‘involved’ will never act to protect freedom of expression. The choice of this interpretation 
can be put down to Australia lacking a genuine human rights framework. Had Australia 
  
119 At 559. 
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adopted the equivalent of s 3 of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 (requiring 
interpretations of statutes and regulations consistent with Convention rights) the Court may 
well have adopted a different interpretation. Interpreting involvement as participation in 
disruptive behaviour is a reading both available to the Court and more consistent with the 
right to freedom of expression. 
Drummond J seeks to justify this wider test for ‘involved’ by invoking the common law 
right for a citizen to act against another if they reasonably believe a breach of the peace 
may occur, and be taken to a magistrate and bound over to ensure that further breaches of 
the peace do not occur. It is argued that because it is not necessary to show that the speaker 
will themselves commit a breach of the peace to conduct such an arrest, it would be illogical 
to impose the same requirement in this regulation. This power has been codified in some 
jurisdictions.120 
This seems liked an unfair standard for restricting expression. The right for a citizen to bind 
over another who they reasonably believe will act in a way which causes a breach of the 
peace seems archaic in and of itself. It would be unlikely to survive the existence of human 
rights legislation: authority supporting the ability to bind over someone based on an 
anticipated breach of the peace by others was overruled in Scotland following the passage 
of the Human Rights Act 1998.121 Nor is this power demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Most citizens rely on law enforcement to control violent protests. If 
there were ever a serious attempt to systematically use this to curtail speech it would likely 
be very detrimental to freedom of expression. 
  
120 Crimes Act 1961, s 42. 
121 Dyer v Brady (2006) SLT 965 (HCJAC). 
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2 Level Of ‘Disruption’ 
 
The core reason that the Court overturns the decision is the lack of evidence to suggest that 
Irving would cause disruption. Firstly it is suggested that the actual evidence that the 
Minister based his decision on, the letter to the Australian Jewish News, is not capable of 
leading to the conclusion that Irving would cause disruption. It is noted by the Department 
of Immigration’s Ethnic Affairs Section in their advice to the Minister that Irving’s work 
as a historian does not lend itself to breaching Australian anti-racism laws, and he is 
unlikely to stir up racial hatred. The advice goes on to suggest that the Controversial 
Visitors Policy would only be breached by Irving if it could be shown that he would 
“encourage violent neo-Nazism”.122 The Minister was advised to seek advice on whether 
this was possible, but never did so.123 This seems to be a fair reading of the policy which 
shows a genuine concern for freedom of expression. 
It is made clear that the hurt feels or ‘psychic harm’ to the Jewish community would not 
constitute the required level of disruption at the original hearing, and so this is not 
considered by the Full Court. The Minister received advice from Mr Parker, the Director 
of the Entry Policy and Procedures Section of the Ministry to the effect that:124 
 “Mr Irving's unconventional views do cause distress among the Jewish community in Australia and 
thus might be properly considered disruptive to that particular group. It is thus open to you to make 
a determination that Mr Irving's intended activities in Australia are likely to cause disruption to a 
group within the Australian community." 
  
122 At 563. 
123 At 566. 
124 At 548. 
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French J appears to uphold the Minister’s decision at the original hearing precisely because 
the Minister ignores this aspect of the advice on the basis that this was not the stated reason 
for the decision on the letter dated March 8th sent to Mr Irving.125 This creates a disconnect 
between the law and the political reality for decision makers. Groups like the Jewish 
community are not likely to resort to violence, but are likely to lobby the Government on 
decisions where they feel grossly offended by a visitor, rather than for the social benefit of 
avoiding community division. It is also the offensiveness and unpopularity of Mr Irving’s 
views which make it a politically popular decision to decline his application. Again this 
shows the importance of a judicial willingness to protect freedom of expression. Judicial 
deference is likely to see the law subverted for political ends.  
Given that hurt feelings was rejected as the type of disruption envisioned by the law, and 
that Irving is unlikely to spark violent neo-Nazism the Court identifies two potential areas 
of division: between proponents of free speech and the Jewish community and within the 
Jewish community. It’s hardly credible that serious division will emerge between these 
first two groups. Despite the turn of phrase, Voltairian ‘defend to the death your right to 
say it’ advocates of free speech rarely feel impassioned enough to oppose those who feel 
offended by certain speech in a confrontation manner. On the second grounds of division 
it seems far more likely that the Jewish community would be united rather than divided by 
the presence of Mr Irving. 
3 Implications for administrative law 
 
  
125 Above at n 108. 
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The regulation which the decision maker must apply here is short and incredibly vague. 
Key terms in ground (c) could have a wide range of different interpretations and meanings. 
This created a substantial amount of uncertainty for the Minister, who received a range of 
different advice about how he could decide the matter. While both the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization declined 
to advise against granting the application, and sections within the Department for 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs did not confirm that Irving breached 
the Controversial Visitors Policy, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet stated that 
“there would appear to be more than sufficient grounds for refusing a visa if that were the 
Minister’s inclination.”126 
Laurence Maher argues that it is important for clarity within immigration law so that it is 
easily understood.127 Statutory and regulatory criteria should be susceptible to proof. Not 
only would this make the process easier for the applicant and the Minister, it would protect 
expression as subjective criteria can too easily allow for the quashing of unpopular speech 
where a deferential approach is taken to review. 
In this case the review was enabled by a statutory provision in the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 s 5(1)(h). Under this provision decisions can be overturned 
“where was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision”. A 
favourable decision in another review case where a decision was taken under grounds (c) 
of the regulations was interpreted as authority for the proposition at decisions can be 
overturned were the evidence was not relevant to or logically probative of the 
  
126 At 562. 
127 Maher “Migration Act Visitor Entry Controls and Free Speech: The Case of David Irving”, above at n 
106, at 378. 
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decision.128129 The Court applied this framework without unnecessary deference or 
conducting a handwringing exercise pondering its own competence relative to that of the 
Minister. The approach enjoys substantial similarities to that taken in Naik. 
The decision revealed a basic failure by the Minister to understand the law he was applying, 
and an excessive level of deference by the Court at first instance. That level of defence may 
be attributable to the case occurring in an immigration space, although French J states no 
clear reasons for deference and does not appear to regard his own decision as particularly 
deferential. That Lee J was also willing to suggest (although not decide) on the grounds 
that the Ministers decision may have contained a level of manifestly unreasonableness 
amounting to an error of law is an indictment on the decision.130 
E Second Decision And Review 
 
The result of the case was that the decision was remitted back to the Minister for 
reconsideration. The Minister came to the same result but on different grounds under the 
public criteria, namely that Irving was not of good character under grounds (a) of the 
requirements.  
Under regulation 4, a person is not of good character if they fall under one of a number of 
categories:131 
 
“(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person is to be taken not to be of good 
character if: 
  
128 Hand v Hell’s Angels Motor Cycling Club Inc (1991) 25 ALD 667 (WA). 
129 At 560. 
130 At 552. 
131 At 546. 
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(a) in the case of an applicant for a visa or an entry permit of any class: 
(i) the applicant has been assessed by the competent Australian authorities to be a risk, 
directly or indirectly, to Australian national security; or 
(ii) the applicant: 
(a) has at any time been convicted of a crime and sentenced to death, to imprisonment for 
life or to imprisonment for a period of not less than one year or; 
(c) has at any time been charged with a crime and either found guilty of having committed 
the crime while of unsound mind or acquitted on the ground that the crime was committed 
while the person was of unsound mind; or 
(d) has been deported from another country; or 
(e) has been excluded from another country in the circumstances prescribed for the 
purposes of subparagraph 20(1)(d)(vi) of the Act; or 
(iii) the applicant has, in the reasonable belief of the Minister, been involved in activities 
indicating contempt, or disregard, for the law or for human rights; 
 
Under category (d) of regulation 4, Mr Irving is not of good character because of his 
deportation from Canada. However a finding that the applicant does not meet the good 
character requirement is not necessarily fatal to an application. Under regulation 143 the 
Minister can grant the application notwithstanding the failure to satisfy the good character 
requirement if:132 
 
(a) the Minister is satisfied that: 
(i) in the case of the circumstance referred to in subparagraph 4(a)(i) (sic) — the 
circumstance no longer obtains; or 
  
132 At 556. 
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(ii) in the case of conduct referred to in subparagraph 4(a)(ii) (sic) or (iii) (sic) — the 
applicant has shown by subsequent conduct that he or she is reformed; and 
(b) the Minister is satisfied that undue harm would be unlikely to result to the Australian 
community if the visa or entry permit was granted; 
 
The Minister is given further grounds to reject the application by s 180A of the Migration 
Act:133   
 
“(1) The Minister may refuse to grant a visa or an entry permit to a person, or may cancel 
a valid visa or a valid entry permit that has been granted to a person, if: 
(a) subsection (2) applies to the person 
 (2) This subsection applies to a person if the Minister: 
(a) having regard to: 
(i) the person's past criminal conduct; or 
(ii) the person's general conduct; 
is satisfied that the person is not of good character; 
 
Unlike the very specific definition given to ‘good character’ as a public interest criterion 
under the regulations, the term good character in the act is not defined. 
The Minister adopted a once bitten twice shy attitude to his decision, gathering a robust 
array of evidence to support his finding that Mr Irving was not of good character. These 
include his conviction under Holocaust denial laws in Germany and subsequent exclusion 
from that country, evidence that he lied under oath in proceedings in the United Kingdom, 
  
133 Migration Act 1958, s 180 (Cth). 
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and his deportation from Canada. These were similarly relied upon as evidence that Mr 
Irving had not reformed and thus was not entitled to an exemption under regulation 143. 
Challenges arguing that these were, among other things, irrelevant considerations were 
unsuccessful. 
F Analysis 
 
It’s more difficult to argue that these are not legitimate grounds for adverse findings against 
Mr Irving. Although the decision has the exact same effect of stopping Mr Irving’s book 
promotion tour, the Minister sought to rely on matters not related to the content of Mr 
Irving’s views or the reaction to them. The fact that Mr Irving has views which he wishes 
to express should not excuse his other conduct, which it is legitimate for the state to view 
suspiciously in an immigration context. The Minister did not seek to rely on the offensive 
nature of Mr Irving’s views as a consideration of his character. 
Irving argued that his conviction under German Holocaust denial was an irrelevant 
consideration because Australia did not have such laws. The Court rejected this 
argument:134 
 
“The conviction in West Germany was not irrelevant and it was not of so little weight that 
no reasonable decision-maker would give attention to it. Germany, like Australia, is a 
democratic country and Mr Irving's conduct in that country was an offence against its 
laws.” 
 
  
134 Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 59 FCR 423 (WADC) at 
432. 
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The logic seems to suggest that, provided a country is ‘democratic’ any offence against its 
laws will not be deemed an irrelevant consideration because the offence involves 
expression. That a country is democratic would only be important in certain cases. Clearly 
one could not argue that a rape conviction in Iran would be an irrelevant consideration 
because of the authoritarian nature of the regime. Where it may be relevant is with regards 
to offenses relevant to expression.  
There is certainly a strong argument that the conviction was not an irrelevant consideration, 
because of its similarity to a conviction under hate speech laws and the special reasons that 
Germany criminalises Holocaust denial, but one the Minister may choose to give weight 
to. The main issue with this rule is that whether or not a country is ‘democratic’ is not 
binary but is a question of degree. Once can imagine cases where the Court may have 
difficulty if it relied upon such a test. 
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V Conclusion 
 
A variety of frameworks exist to deal with issues regarding the freedom of movement and 
freedom of expression. Most do not give the full weight to freedom of expression that it 
deserves, either through allowing a hecklers veto or by accepting dubious grounds for 
exclusion such as protecting community harmony. These ground would rightly be 
dismissed in any court if applied to prosecute a citizen for expressing their views. If we 
value freedom of expression as a tool to improve our society, it is wrong to set double 
standards for those who can contribute to our discourse but are not citizens. 
While the existence of a human rights framework is a useful tool, it does not necessarily 
lead to a more sound human rights based approach. Courts are always attempting to balance 
competing considerations, and this means they are not always willing to fulfil their role. 
As the Farrakhan approach and the approach in the first Irving case demonstrate, 
sometimes courts show excessive deference in the immigration space. Where the issue 
purely concerns expression, courts ought to apply a high standard of review to fulfil their 
role as a protector of human rights. Decision makers often do not apply the law correctly 
and base their conclusions on weak or irrelevant evidence. Thankfully, more recent case 
and cases in higher courts tend to demonstrate more of a willingness to do this. 
The wider social issues raised by the cases should also not be ignored. While this paper 
primarily focuses on legal frameworks, it should be observed that all three United Kingdom 
cases demonstrate a society struggling to deal with the implications of multiculturalism by 
excluding speakers who claim to represent extreme ends both majority and minority 
cultures. The decision maker’s actions appear to be influenced by a desire to quash 
potentially inflammatory debate in each case. This is short term thinking, it will never a 
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successful strategy to deal with wider issues. Often an outside perspective is necessary to 
represent unpopular view in a society struggling to deal with that issue. In particular, 
minorities are in need of strong voices. Social unrest is often an underlying problem that 
cannot be combatted simply by supressing controversial expression. 
Some of the cases dealt with raise issues which plaining are not dealt with in the context 
of a debate around freedom of expression. This should be no surprise, those with 
controversial views also lead controversial lives. It was never the case in this paper that 
those issues should always be discussed within the context of what best promotes freedom 
of expression, or that freedom of expression will always be the primary issue before 
decision makers. Two examples of this are the Naik case and the Irving case. In the later 
the applicant was denied entry on good character ground which were unrelated to his views. 
It is very reasonable for states to be able to regulate in this way. Past behaviour is a predictor 
of future behaviour, an applicant with a history of lawlessness or facing deportation from 
democratic countries could be expected to violate laws in other democratic countries they 
visit. However where the behaviour being targeted is not illegal behaviour but a view 
expressed by the visitor, exclusion will rarely be justified. 
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